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achieving security. Broadening the scope of negotiations also provides more
opportunities for cooperation on economic, scientific, and educational issues.
Linkage of such an array of issues, including human security and economic benefits,
should be utilized to achieve progress. East Asian states should seize the opportunity
to find common ground and create a permanent security structure for the region.
Resolving the DPRK problem within this context would improve the prospects for a
more sustainable security and prevention of another nuclear crisis from erupting in
the near future. 
A Regional Solution for Human Rights and the End of Weapons of Mass Destruction in North Korea 
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Abstract
The driving factor behind Korea’s push for development of infrastructure is its recognition in recent
years that the acute lack of infrastructure in key sectors affects the country’s overall productivity.
Despite this pressing need, the government has had to turn to the private sector for its much-needed
greenfield infrastructure projects due to budgetary and financial constraints. In this respect, the
Korean government firmly recognizes the correlation between a nation’s highly-developed
infrastructure and its overall competitiveness in today’s globalized economy, and it is this need for
development which has led the Korean government to focus on its private participation in
infrastructure (“PPI”) scheme, encouraging both equity and debt participation by domestic and
foreign participants. 
With the inauguration of president Roh Moo Hyun in 2003, Korea’s recently announced policy
initiative to become the Northeast Asian economic hub will be a further impetus for development of its
much-needed infrastructure. The success of the Korean government in inducing private investment in
infrastructure can be seen in the relative level of interest by both domestic and foreign participants.
The Korean PPI sector is currently experiencing an increase in “bottom-up” efforts with increasingly
heated competition amongst potential participants through submission of project proposals for not only
projects that are “solicited” by the government, but also for projects that are “unsolicited.” Indeed, by
some industry estimates, $70 billion to $80 billion worth of infrastructure projects should come on
stream in the next five years. Many of these projects when completed will alleviate the problems of a
fast-growing economy such as Korea, particularly in areas such as roads and transport infrastructure.
The objectives for this discussion are as follows: 1) to provide an overview of the current regulatory
framework and market environment for Korean PPI projects, especially from the viewpoint of potential
international debt and equity investors; 2) to highlight some of the more important regulatory features
found in the PPI Act and its Enforcement Decree - noting current market practice by PPI participants
as most often embodied in the concession agreement; 3) to address some of the major risk factors
inherent in Korean PPI projects (which may or may not necessarily be unique to the Korean PPI
context); and 4) to provide recommendations for improvement of the regulatory framework related to
the assessment and allocation of risks by project participants.
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I.  Introduction
The Republic of Korea’s infrastructure market has traditionally been an area
reserved for investment by the central government, with direct investment by the
private sector playing a secondary role. Upon the aftermath of the 1997 financial
crisis, and with the subsequent drastic economic policy changes implemented by then
president Kim, Dae-Jung,1) Korea has vigorously sought more innovative approaches
to develop its much-needed infrastructure, one of the key initiatives related to the
overall restructuring of the Korean economy. In this regard, the Planning and Budget
Committee of the government announced its economic policy in July 1998, which
included plans to: 1) privatize state-owned enterprises, 2) create a regulatory
framework for private participation in infrastructure (“PPI”), 3) promote competition
in the market, 4) address labor issues, and 5) find optimal privatization techniques.2)
With the announcement of the 1993-1997 Five-Year Economic Development
Plan, the government committed itself to improving the living standards of Koreans
through programs in development of housing, improvements in the environment and
alleviation of urban congestion, while expanding what it refers to as “social
overhead capital” (e.g., transportation and distribution networks).3) In this regard, as
of 2001, Korea’s infrastructure budget reached 14.6% of the national budget, up
from 11.2% in 1993 and 14.2% in 1997.4)
1) See generally, Young-Hak Kim, “Economic Overview”, INT’L. FIN. L. REV., available at <www.legalmedia
group.com/iflr/default.asp?Page=1&SID=3860&F=F>. The areas of the economy restructured have included
corporate, financial, public and labor sectors. For instance, in the financial sector, “As of the end of February 2002, a
total of 618 insolvent financial institutions had been closed down, including 14 banks, 28 merchant banks and 15
insurance companies. Foreign interests are now becoming major players. One leading financial institution, Korea
First Bank, has been sold to Newbridge Capital of the US. Further international financial institutions, such as
Commerzbank and Allianz Life, have expanded their presence in Korea through joint ventures. Since the crisis, the
Korean government has consistently targeted the financial industry in an effort not only to plug the gaps, but to
ensure that it will secure world-class competitiveness.” See id.
2) See Jaebong Ro, “Infrastructure Development in Korea”, 19, available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/
groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan008650.pdf>.
3) See Ro, supra note 2 at 7.
4) See id.
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The driving factor behind Korea’s push for development of infrastructure is its
recognition in recent years that the acute lack of infrastructure in key sectors directly
affects the country’s overall productivity (e.g., due to the lack of adequate roads and
highways).5) According to certain estimates, for example, Korea’s total logistics costs
attributable to an inadequate road network amounts to 17% of GDP.6) Despite this
pressing need, the government has had to turn to the private sector for its much-
needed greenfield infrastructure projects due to budgetary and financial constraints.
In this respect, the Korean government appears to firmly recognize the correlation
between a nation’s highly- developed infrastructure and its overall competitiveness
in today’s globalized economy, and it is this need for development which has led the
Korean government to focus on its PPI scheme, encouraging both equity and debt
participation by domestic and foreign participants. 
In addition, the pace of development of PPI projects in Korea may be attributable
to the drive for privatization of state-owned enterprises, which has been one of the
hallmarks of the economic liberalization policies in newly-industrialized countries
(“NICs”) such as Korea. For instance, because governments of NICs are often
politically constrained in their ability to charge tariff rates for the use of
infrastructure facilities in excess of certain levels - even at the expense of operating at
below cost7)-such governments have focused on private ownership of infrastructure
facilities under the banner of economic efficiency.8)
5) See id. at  6; See also Nick Lord, “Building bridges...(and roads and tunnels and ports)”, FINANCEASIA, 40
(May 2002).
6) See Ro, supra note 2 at 21.
7) See generally, Yang Ho Oh, “Privatization”, INT’L. FIN. L. REV., available at www.legalmediagroup.com/
iflr/default.asp?Page=1&SID=3868&F=F. Privatization efforts in Korea have included such utilities industries as
telecommunications, electricity, gas and steel. As of the time of writing, the government has not been successful in
privatizing its state-owned enterprises in all of these industries (most notably the Korea Electric Power Co or
“KEPCO”) mainly due to opposition from different segments of Korean society - notably, organized labor - and the
lack of a systematic approach and organized government leadership. See id. There have been, however, some
notable successes in such industries as steel (POSCO) and heavy industries (Korea Heavy Industry Corp.). For a
brief discussion of the social impact of privatization efforts in Korea, see generally Kim Jin Soo, “Privatization,
conflict and discontent”, SOCIAL WATCH, available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/
apcity/unpan008668.pdf.
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With the inauguration of president Roh Moo Hyun in 2003, Korea’s recently-
announced policy initiative to become the Northeast Asian economic hub will be a
further impetus for development of its much-needed infrastructure.9) Indeed, the
most recent 2003 Annual Plan for Private Participation in Infrastructure (the “2003
Annual Plan”) specifically identifies the Northeast Asian economic hub initiative as
a key basis for promoting PPI.10) Another related policy basis put forth by the Roh
administration is the promotion of PPI for the purpose of stimulating the currently
lagging Korean economy.11) All eyes are on the president Roh to see whether he will
continue the difficult task of economic restructuring begun by his predecessor.12)
8) For instance, in the subway infrastructure sector in Korea, which is handled by local city governments, tariffs
do not cover construction costs, and attempts to adjust them have not been successful in the past. See Ro, supra note
2 at 21. Similarly, the road sector’s ability to increase its tolls charged to users is restrained. Even with soaring traffic
congestion throughout the country, the Korea Highway Corporation (the national operator of Korea’s road system)
raised toll rates by a meager 5.2% in 2002 - the first such increase in several years - 88% of which goes to
repayment of interest and principal on outstanding loans. See PICKO/KRIHS, PPI PROGRAM AND INVESTMENT
PROJECTS IN KOREA, 25 (2002), available at <http://picko.krihs.re.kr/eng/content/eng_n007/d0/5.3.5.3.ppi_system.
pdf>. In contrast, private operation of infrastructure, in theory, would be based more on market principles, allowing
for operators to charge market rates. Some observers believe, due monopolistic conditions, the opposite could be just
as likely. See generally Nagla Nassar, “Essay: Project Finance, Public Utilities, and Public Concerns: A
Practitioner’s Perspective”, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 60, 61 (2000) (discussing the possibility of less-than competitive
arrangements in PPI projects due to lack of alternative service providers).  
9) See BBC News/World Edition, “Roh Moo-hyun’s inauguration speech,” available at<http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/low/asia-pacific/2797053.stm.>
10) See PICKO/KRIHS, 2003 ANNUAL PLAN FOR PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE, 97, available
at <http://www.picko.krihs.re.kr/eng/content/eng_sys3/d0/4.1.2003_PPI_Annual_Plan.PDF>.
11) See id. The 2003 Annual Plan provides that promotion of private investment in infrastructure will help
stimulate economic recovery by “Tak[ing] advantage of trends that stimulate project finance such as low interest
rates, plentiful liquidity, and the increased interest of financial investors such as pension and endowment funds in
PPI.” See id.
12) See generally, Lauren Scott,”Korea-Resisting the Cold”, ASIANLEGALONLINE, (May 2003), available at
<http://www.asianlegalonline.com/asia/detail_article.cfm?ArticleID=827> (discussing the various reform issues
facing the current administration). Many view the current Roh administration with skepticism, but there are those
that equally believe that president Roh will continue the restructuring, especially as to Korea’s conglomerates known
as “chaebol”.  
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A. Current Market Trends in Korean PPI
The success of the Korean government in inducing private investment in
infrastructure can be seen in the level of interest by both domestic and foreign
participants. The Korean PPI sector is currently experiencing an increase in “bottom-
up” efforts with increasingly heated competition 13) among potential participants
through submission of project proposals for not only projects that are “solicited” by
the government, but also for projects that are “unsolicited.” Indeed, by some
industry estimates, $70 billion to $80 billion worth of infrastructure projects should
come on stream in the next five years.14) Many of these projects when completed will
alleviate the problems of a fast-growing economy such as Korea, particularly in the
roads and transport infrastructure areas. 
In particular, the roads sector has received much attention of late especially since
this is an area of strategic economic importance in facilitating rapid industrial growth
around major metropolitan areas in Korea. As such, the government currently plans
to promote approximately 60% of total investment for the construction of new
roads.15) As of 2002, the government was promoting 21 road projects totaling
13) According to local lawyers, firms such as Shinhan Macquarie Financial Advisory, which is a joint venture
between Shinhan Financial Group and Macquarie Bank, has been going “gangbusters” for mandates on Korean
infrastructure projects. See Scott, supra note 12. Shinhan Macquarie Financial Advisory also established the Korean
Road Infrastructure Fund in January 2003 to invest in road infrastructure projects in Korea; KRIF recently invested
US$27 million in the five-year project bonds issued by the Daegu-Busan Expressway Company, a toll road project
connecting two urban centers, Daegu and Busan.  See, Korea fund buys toll road stake, CNN, Oct. 9, 2003, available
at <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/BUSINESS/10/09/korea.macquarie.biz/>.
14) See Lord, supra note 5 at 40 (quoting John Walker, President and CEO of Shinhan Macquarie Financial
Advisory).
15) See PICKO/KRIHS, PPI PROGRAM AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN KOREA, 23. Please refer to this
source for a discussion of Korea’s infrastructure needs in the roads sector. As to some notable road projects, the
Daegu-Busan Expressway project is an 82-kilometer toll road linking the southern metropolitan city of Daegu with
the southern port city of Busan. The project cost is US$2.14 billion, and is to be completed in early 2006. The project
company holds a 31 year operation and management right. See CNN.com, Korea fund buys toll road stake. Another is
the Seoul Beltway project, which was met with opposition by environmental and religious groups, preventing
completion of the last section of the beltway. The government formed a committee to resolve the dispute, but delays
in construction have lasted for many months since November 2001. See Kim Ki-tae, Major SOC Projects Up in the
Air, available at <http://168.126.177.8/project/Press.nsf/WebView1/88FE93F117FF2D7449256D40000072D9>.
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US$10.7 billion,16) with total projected investment of US$50.8 billion between the
years 2000 and 2004.17)
The government’s analysis of the current competitive environment in the PPI
market, and its desire to balance out overall investment by promoting underdeveloped
PPI sectors, is summarized by this statement in the 2003 Annual Plan: “Management
of excessive competition in unsolicited projects centered around road projects in the
capital area through rational administration of annual project implementation scale
and priorities.”18) It remains to be seen how the government will in practice even out
the current competitive environment for PPI projects.
II.  Objectives
The objectives for this discussion are as follows: 1) to provide an overview of the
current regulatory framework and market environment for Korean PPI projects,
especially from the viewpoint of potential international debt and equity investors; 2)
to highlight some of the more important regulatory features found in the PPI Act and
its Enforcement Decree - noting current market practice by project participants as
most often embodied in the concession agreement;19) 3) to address some of the major
risk factors in Korean PPI projects (which may or may not necessarily be unique to
the Korean PPI context); and 4) to provide recommendations for improvement of the
regulatory framework related to the assessment and allocation of risks by project
participants.
16) See PICKO/KRIHS, PPI PROGRAM AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN KOREA, 25.
17) See id. at 30. The US$50.8 billion in total road sector investment would be divided up between the
government (US$42.1 billion) and private sector (US$8.7 billion). See id.
18) See 2003 Annual Plan, 98. The government also recognizes the need to diversify the types of private
investors in the PPI sector beyond construction companies. See id.
19) A concession agreement is an agreement entered into by the relevant government ministry and the project
company detailing the terms and conditions of the PPI project.  
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III.  Private Participation in Infrastructure and 
Economic Restructuring 
Before discussing in more detail the government policy, regulatory framework
and commercial environment, the Korean PPI scheme should be placed in context,
most notably the economic restructuring initiated by the Korean government  related
to of its corporate and financial institutions and markets. The economic restructuring
in Korea was prompted by the Asian financial crisis,20) and this event triggered a
greater pace of liberalization of the Korean market, as a result of which foreign
investors gained greater access to restricted areas of investment.  Likewise, Korean
corporations and financial institutions have also benefited from this liberalization
through its greater ability to access the international capital markets.21) It is within
this context in which the Korean government has implemented a policy of proactive
and aggressive promotion of its PPI scheme.  
Because of the interrelationship between the economic restructuring and the PPI
scheme, government support for PPI may be intrinsically tied to such restructuring
efforts (the argument goes), with the ever-present possibility that the government
would be tempted to breach its commitments in project agreements entered into with
private investors during difficult economic and political circumstances.22) Such actions
would obviously not only jeopardize the credibility of Korea’s PPI program, but also
discredit the Korean government and its economic programs. For a developing country
20) See generally Hwa-Jin Kim, “Living With the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and
Regulation of Financial Institutions”, 17 BERKELEY J. INTL. L. 61 (1999) (outlining the various corporate governance
and financial regulatory reform measures enacted by the Korean government since the Asian financial crisis). The
bailout fund extended to the Korean government by the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) was through the
Korea-IMF Memorandum (“IMF Memorandum”). Notable reform measures under the IMF Memorandum upon
which the bailout fund was conditional included corporate transparency measures (e.g., introduction of the concept
of “outside directors”), government non-intervention in commercial lending activities of banks and restructuring of
corporate finances. See generally Kim, “Living With the IMF”.  
21) See Kim, “Living With the IMF” at 89-90.
22) Most notably, the Dabhol Power project in Maharashtra, India is the most recent example of the risk of
governments choosing, for political reasons, to not honor its commitments to private investors. See generally
Harvard Business School, Enron Development Corporation: The Power Project in Maharashtra, India (A) (1998)
for a discussion of this now infamous project.  
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such as Korea, which has limited financial resources for undertaking massive
development projects, such actions would be anathema, especially in the context of
the harsh realities of today’s international financial markets. It is this author’s view
that this interrelationship may, in the end, actually constrain the government’s ability
to breach its project commitments with private investors by significantly raising the
political and economic costs incurred by breach. Any signs of dwindling support for
PPI projects by the government could be viewed as the signs of a retreat from its
commitment to push forward wider economic restructuring efforts.
Furthermore, the current regulatory framework encourages investment in a whole
range of sectors, as opposed to some countries that have promoted just one or two
government “pet” projects or sectors. In the latter case, the political and economic
costs incurred by a government in expropriating one or two pet projects may be
different than in the former case where government breach in one or two projects
may be seen as jeopardizing the PPI program as a whole. It is this aspect of the
Korean PPI program, which may constrain the Korean government’s ability to take
any drastic unilateral measures in breach of project commitments. Furthermore,
countries that promote “pet” projects could be more vulnerable to political pressures
upon changes in government leadership.23) In both of these cases, the motivations
may appear identical, but the end results may be quite different.
IV.  Government Policy and Administrative Procedures
International project finance is characterized by a high degree of concentration of
project risks in the “pre-completion” phase, with more ascertainable project risks
upon the commencement of operation. Because of this unique risk profile, the value
of early information about potential project risks is of significant value, particularly
in relation to such areas as government policies, strategies, political stability and
project parameters and benchmarks.24) To the extent such information is clearly set
23) In the Dabhol Power project, the government that had originally led the support for the project was ousted
by a rival coalition that brought alleged corruption and other charges, appealing to nationalist sentiments. Indeed, the
project became highly politicized during the election process. See generally id.
24) See Mansoor Dailami and Danny Leipziger, “International Project Finance and Capital Flow: A new
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forth or readily ascertainable, project participants will be able to appropriately
measure the level of risk of particular projects and factor in such determinations into
their project assessments.  
The Korean government’s effort to project a transparent regulatory framework
and investment environment is reflected in the various government pronouncements
related to its PPI sector. The following pronouncements should aid potential private
project participants in effective risk assessment of the PPI sector.
A. Basic Scheme for PPI 
In this regard, the Korean government’s policy for implementation of its “Basic
Scheme” for the PPI program is summarized as follows:
1) Change from a government-centered or government-financed scheme to a
private-sector-oriented or private-investment-initiated scheme25) - One of the clear
policy reasons for the stated direction is to attract foreign capital (both debt and
equity).
2) Promotion of creativity and efficiency from the private sector throughout the
stages of planning, design, construction and operation of the infrastructure project 26)
- Clearly the government believes that giving the private sector the power to initiate
infrastructure projects fosters a more efficient allocation of resources throughout the
different stages of infrastructure development.
3) Restructuring domestic systems to meet international standards 27) - The
government has provided many favorable incentives to private investors in the form
of a competitive rate of return on investment, minimum operation revenue
guarantee, foreign exchange risk reduction, and a termination payment/buyout of the
project, some of which will be discussed in more detail below.
perspective”, WORLD BANK DEV. INST., 5 (1997).
25) See PICKO/KRIHS, PPI PROGRAM AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN KOREA, 13. This is a good
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B. Mid to Long Term Plan for Private Investment Projects
Furthermore, the Mid to Long Term Plan for Private Investment Projects (the
“Mid/Long Term Plan”),28) encompassing the period from 2002 to 2011, provides the
basic government policy with respect to PPI and states that it is to “Relieve the
burden on government expenditures by inducing private investment in infrastructure
in response to the increased demand for government expenditure such as
strengthening of welfare systems and expansion of future investments.” Based on
the government’s estimated forecast, total infrastructure investment required during
the 2002 to 2011 period is 198.9 trillion won, with government expenditure
projected to be 10 to 13 trillion won annually (approximately 2.4% of GDP,
assuming 4% to 6% GDP growth) and private investment of 46.7 trillion won.29)
C. Annual Plan for Private Participation in Infrastructure 
Since 1999, the government has formulated its Annual Plan for Private Participation
in Infrastructure (the “Annual Plan”), which includes more detailed information on
the government’s policy orientation for each infrastructure sector, matters
concerning designation of solicited projects, investment scope and support for PPI
projects in general.30)
As the government gains increased experience in the administration of PPI
projects, such experience should be reflected in improved administrative procedures
and the overall regulatory framework. It is clear that the most recent 2003 Annual
Plan embodies initiatives for such improvement of the existing PPI scheme through
various measures.
D. Private Infrastructure Investment Center of Korea (“PICKO”)
The governmental agency responsible for coordinating the central government’s
28) The Mid to Long Term Plan for Private Investment Projects is available at <http://picko.krihs.re.kr/eng/bbs/
list.asp?name=eng_sys4&group=sys4>. 
29) See Mid/Long Term Plan.
30) See Article 7 of PPI Act.
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promotion efforts is known as the Private Infrastructure Investment Center of Korea
(“PICKO”),31) which is under the umbrella of the government-operated Korea
Research Institute for Human Settlements (“KRIHS”). PICKO was established
pursuant to the PPI Act.32) Much of the credit for the positive investor sentiment in
regards to Korean PPI can be attributed to PICKO, which has greatly facilitated the
entire private investment process.  
As to its statutorily-delegated authority, PICKO is authorized to review
individual solicited projects, conduct feasibility studies and evaluate project
proposals.33) In contrast, it is the Private Investment Project Committee (“Project
Committee”), organized under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Planning and
Budget,34) that is statutorily-authorized to conduct such activities as policy formulation,
establishment of the Annual Plan and designation of the concessionaire.35) The
government agency having jurisdiction over a particular project (referred to as the
“competent authority” in the PPI Act), however, must request the director of PICKO
to review a potential concessionaire’s project proposal for unsolicited projects,36) and
the director of PICKO must submit his opinion on whether to accept such project
proposal to the competent authority and the Minister of Planning and Budget.37)
Accordingly, the competent authority is to make its determination, “taking into
consideration the opinion of the director of PICKO, except in cases,”38) which gives
the opinion of the director of PICKO some weight in the competent authority’s
decision to designate a concessionaire. Accordingly, if the competent authority
determines that it will accept the project proposal, it must submit the matter for
deliberation to the Project Committee.39)
Furthermore, it is worth noting that under Article 7 (4) of PPI Act, the competent
31) PICKO’s website is at <http://picko.krihs.re.kr/eng/>. 
32) See Article 23 of PPI Act.
33) See Article 23 (1) of PPI Act.
34) The Ministry of Planning and Budget’s website is available at <http://www.mpb.go.kr>.
35) See Article 5 of PPI Act.
36) See Article 7(2) of PPI Act.
37) See Article 7 (3) of PPI Act.
38) See Article 7 (4) of PPI Act.
39) See Article 7 (4) of PPI Act.  
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authority is procedurally required to notify a potential concessionaire of its decision
after receipt of the opinion of the director of PICKO, implying the importance of the
opinion of the director of PICKO in the determination of the competent authority.
Also, the 2003 Annual Plan specifically provides that the competent authority
having jurisdiction over a particular project that is valued at 200 billion won or more
must consult with PICKO when concluding the concession agreement.40)
As a practical matter, because of the administrative function and authority given
to PICKO, potential project sponsors should establish contact with key members of
PICKO early in the process of determining whether to invest in the Korean PPI
sector. PICKO is often involved during the actual process of negotiating the
concession agreement and may be delegated authority to finalize or modify
concession agreements by the competent authority over a specified PPI project.41)
V.  Regulatory Framework - PPI Act
Despite its short history, Korea’s PPI scheme has been hailed as a model for other
fast-developing countries throughout Asia and other parts of the world. Much of the
interest in Korea’s PPI program is attributable to the government’s promulgation of
the Act on the Private Investment in Infrastructure (“PPI Act”),42) the Enforcement
Decree of the Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure (“Enforcement
Decree”) 43) in 1999 and the aggressive promotion of the PPI scheme to various
potential investor groups.  It is worth noting that prior to its passage, only the public
sector could initiate projects pursuant to certain industry sector specific laws (e.g.,
the Harbor Act authorizing development of Korea’s harbor sector).44) As a result of
40) See 2003 Annual Plan, 120.
41) See id.
42) The text of the PPI Act can be found at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/
unpan011496.pdf>
43) The text of the Enforcement Decree can be found at <http://picko.krihs.re.kr/eng/content/eng_sys2/d0/2.1.
2003_enforcement_.PDF>
44) See generally, Jay K. Lee and Kwon Hoe Kim, “Project Finance”, INT’L. FIN. L. REV., available at <www.
legalmediagroup.com/iflr/default.asp?Page=1&SID=3869&F=F>
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the PPI Act, however, both the public and private sectors may initiate and develop
projects in the industry sectors designated pursuant to its provisions.  
More importantly, the level of government financial and other support for
infrastructure projects with private participation was previously unavailable for
projects initiated by the government. The most notable government support under
the PPI Act includes the minimum revenue guarantee, financial subsidy and buyout
payment. Certain tax benefits are also given to project companies.45)
The following section looks at some of the more important provisions of the PPI
Act and its Enforcement Decree, which embody the regulatory framework for
Korean PPI. In examining some of these provisions, the discussion will also reflect
some general legislative principles outlined in the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Legislative Guide on Privately Financed
Infrastructure (the “UNCITRAL Guide”) as applicable.46) UNCITRAL is a
commission established under the auspices of the United Nations in order to
facilitate the harmonization of private international law,47) and the UNCITRAL
Guide contains a set of recommended legislative principles “intended to assist in the
establishment of a legislative framework favourable to privately financed
infrastructure projects.”48) Besides the legislative framework itself, the UNCITRAL
Guide recognizes the importance of “adequate administrative structures and
practices, organizational capability, technical expertise, appropriate human and
financial resources and economic stability.”49)
Contrary to previous work of UNCITRAL, although the UNCITRAL Guide was
not drafted as a model law-and despite the criticisms levied against the UNCITRAL
Guide in this regard50)-it is a useful guide with which observers of national private
45) For example, 5% of the amount invested by a project company is recognized as investment reserves,
permitting deduction as expense from the corporate income tax; 0% VAT for infrastructure facilities constructed
under the BTO and BOT schemes. See sec. 4.1 of 2003 Annual Plan.
46) The UNCITRAL Guide can be found at <http://www.uncitral.org/english/workinggroups/wg_1/wg1-pfip-
index-e.htm.>
47) UNCITRAL’s website can be found at <http://www.uncitral.org.>
48) See sec. A par. 5. of UNCITRAL Guide.
49) See sec. A par. 6 of UNCITRAL Guide.
50) See generally Don Wallace, Jr.,” UNCITRAL Consolidated Legislative Recommendations for the Draft
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infrastructure laws can: 1) analyze key provisions of relevant legislation and
government policy with respect to private infrastructure projects to determine
whether such provisions and policies are consistent with current international
practice:2) assess whether the overall administrative procedures and framework as
well as the technical and economic resources provide for a competitive environment
responsive to the concerns and incentives of private project participants.
A. Methods for Investment
The PPI Act authorizes projects under the 1) build-transfer-operate (BTO),51) 2)
build-operate-transfer (BOT),52) 3) build-own-operate (BOO),53) and other methods
proposed by the competent authority in the instructions for proposal.54)
B. Concession Granting Authority
Although the Government of the Republic of Korea is responsible for
formulating the Annual Plan,55) the governmental authority having jurisdiction over a
Chapters of a Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects: UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide
on Privately Financed Infrastructure: Achievement and Prospects”, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 283, 286-87 (2000)
(discussing the criticism that the nature of the UNCITRAL’s work, which is to provide model law provisions for
countries to follow (i.e., harmonization of national laws to prevailing international standards), was not achieved in
the case of the UNCITRAL Guide). Wallace argues that it was the unwillingness of the UNCITRAL commission to
face up to the fact that civil law systems apply administrative law to “concessions” as opposed to civil, commercial
law of private contracts - giving civil law governments the right to freely alter the scope of the project - as the main
reason for the UNCITRAL Guide not being adopted in the form of a model law. See id. at 287.
51) In a BTO project, ownership of the project facilities is transferred to the government upon completion of
construction and the concessionaire bears the right to operate the project facilities for the concession period. See
Article 4 par. 1 of PPI Act.
52) In a BOT project, concessionaire assumes ownership of the project facilities for a specified period of time
after completion of construction, and ownership of project facilities is transferred to the government upon
termination of the concession period. See Article 4 par. 2 of PPI Act.
53) In a BOO project, concessionaire operates and controls the project facilities upon completion of
construction. See Article 4 par. 3 of PPI Act.
54) See Article 4 of PPI Act.
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particular project (“competent authority”) - e.g., Ministry of Maritime & Fisheries,
Ministry of Construction & Transportation - is delegated the authority to formulate
the instructions for proposal56) and to designate the concessionaire57) for a specific
project.58)
The UNCITRAL Guide’s general principle for the concessionaire selection
process is that of transparent competition among eligible project sponsors. This is
believed best achieved by implementing a balance between providing some statutory
structures while allowing for free negotiations between project participants.59)
Accordingly, the Korean government implements certain factors into its process
for evaluation of project proposals by potential concessionaires under the PPI Act.
The government is required to consider various factors in its evaluation of a
submitted project proposal, including: 1) the make-up of the project sponsors, 2)
feasibility of the project, including total investment cost, the period, location and
details of construction, 3) financing plan, including equity and loan procurement
capacity, 4) economic feasibility of the project, including the tariff rate, 5) plan for
land acquisition, 6) applicable construction technology, 7) managerial capability, 8)
degree of service in the public interest, and 9) other measures deemed necessary by
the competent authority.60) Pursuant to statute, however, the government does have
significant leeway in applying these standards to a given project, which is a risk that
project sponsors cannot completely avoid.61)
55) See Article 7 of PPI Act. Please note that the function of formulating the Annual Plan is actually delegated
to the Minister of Planning & Budget upon deliberation by its Private Investment Project Committee and in
consultation with the relevant competent authority. See Article 5 (1) of PPI Act.
56) See Article 10 of PPI Act.
57) The concessionaire for a project is the project company granted the operation and management right (i.e.,
concession) by the competent authority to construct, operate and manage the project for a specified number of years. 
58) See Article 13 (3) and (4) of PPI Act.
59) See id. at 292. Selection of concessionaire based on negotiations alone may be seen as arbitrary and lacking
transparency. See id. at 291.
60) See Article 13 of Enforcement Decree. The competent authority may adjust the weight given to each
criterion according to the special needs of a given project. See Article 13 (2) of Enforcement Decree.
61) For instance, the competent authority may adjust the weight given to each criterion according to the special
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C. Concession Agreement
The designated concessionaire for a given project enters into a concession
agreement with the competent authority for “the conditions for project implementation
such as total project cost and the concession period.”62)
D. Operation and Management Right (In Rem)
Upon completion of construction of a project facility, the competent authority is
authorized to grant the operation and management right to the concessionaire to
operate the project,63) which the concessionaire must then register with the competent
authority.64) The operation and management right is deemed a property right pursuant
to the Civil Act,65) and the concessionaire must receive advance approval from the
competent authority for actions such as “dispositions.” 66)
E. Determination of Tariff Rate
The issue of tariffs can be a politically sensitive topic for many NICs, including
Korea, and the high profile nature of many greenfield infrastructure projects,
especially in cases with significant foreign participation, may open up the
government to varying degrees of political criticism, especially from political sectors
dependent on popular support.
The PPI Act provides that the concessionaire may charge a tariff to users of
project facilities,67) but the concessionaire must submit certain documents regarding
the tariff rate to be charged to the competent authority sixty (60) days prior to actual
needs of a given project. See Article 13 (2) of Enforcement Decree.
62) See Article 13 (3) of PPI Act.
63) See Article 26 (1) of PPI Act.
64) See Article 26 (2) of PPI Act.
65) See Article 27 (1) of PPI Act.
66) See Article 27 (2) of PPI Act. Security can be taken over the operation and management right in the form of
a kun mortgage under Korean law. Project lenders should obtain local counsel advice on this matter.  
67) See Article 25 (4) of PPI Act.
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collection.68) The specifics pertaining to the determination or adjustment of tariffs,
however, are to be settled according to the concession agreement.69)
The PPI Act also alludes to the competent authority’s right to request the
concessionaire to charge a tariff lower than what the concessionaire has determined
to charge users of the project facilities70) (generally the type of right reserved by the
government in regulating PPI projects). The issue of tariff rate adjustments may
reflect the government’s concern for the general public - i.e., the concern for charging
a “politically correct” price.71) The circumstances under which the government could
make a request for lowering/adjustment of tariffs are spelled out in the concession
agreement and might include such reasons as sector specific economic policy
reasons (i.e., raising the competitiveness of a given project’s sector) or even
regulatory issues affecting the project. It is unclear whether the concessionaire could
reject a government request for adjustment; mere prior “consultation” with the
concessionaire may be the only requirement to be fulfilled by the government.
In the event of a government request for tariff adjustment, the concessionaire
should, to the extent possible, be adequately compensated in the form of a financial
subsidy or adjustment of the concession period, as any costs related to political
considerations should in theory be borne by the government.  
Instead of leaving the details to be worked out through negotiations by the
parties, however, the government should amend the PPI Act to clarify: 1) the
concessionaire’s rights in the event of a lowering/adjustment of tariffs and 2) the
concessionaire’s right to reject any government request for tariff adjustments.72) Such
an amendment could significantly aid project sponsors and lenders in their risk
assessments.
68) See Article 23 (2) of Enforcement Decree. This provision seems to imply that the competent authority may
have a right to veto the concessionaire’s determination of the tariff pursuant to the concession agreement.
69) See Article 23 (1) and (3) of Enforcement Decree. Under the concession agreement, the concessionaire is
typically given flexibility in determining the tariff to be charged users of the project facilities, but such determination
is subject to an adjustment by the competent authority.
70) See Article 10 of PPI Act.
71) See Nassar supra note 8 at 77. In Korea, such controversy did arise at one point over the toll rate to be
charged on the new expressway running from the city of Seoul to the Incheon International Airport.
72) The right to reject a government request for tariff adjustments may be in contravention of the administrative
policy principle that government should retain the broad authority to regulate infrastructure projects.
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F. Minimum Revenue Guarantee
Private investors contemplating participation in Korean PPI projects will
undoubtedly be concerned over the level of support (financial or otherwise) by the
Korean government as well as the level of return on investment. To alleviate
profitability risk, the Korean government has implemented a minimum revenue
guarantee system during the operation period of the concession-based project.73) The
statutory language states that the government may grant a subsidy or long-term loan
where operational profits fall “considerably short” of estimated profits “to such an
extent that the operation of the facility is difficult.” 74) In lieu of this language, the
korean government has typically guaranteed up to 90% of estimated project revenue
for solicited projects, and up to 80% of estimated project revenue for unsolicited
projects.75)
The flip side to this minimum revenue guarantee is that the project sponsors are
often required to return to the Korean government project revenues, typically in
excess of 110% (solicited projects) and 120% (unsolicited projects) of estimated
project revenue.76) This minimum revenue guarantee system is implemented for a
fixed period (e.g., 20 years).
It is important to note, however, that such statutory guarantee of minimum
73) See Article 35 of PPI Act and Article 37 of Enforcement Decree. One observer has argued that such
minimum revenue guarantees (and the corresponding obligation to revert excess revenues to the government) may
be in contravention of the fundamental rationale for privatization of infrastructure, which is to enhance efficiency of
operation and quality of service to the public. See Nassar, supra note 8 at 67. One way it can do this is by
encouraging the project’s tariff to be fixed at higher prices so that the excess revenue reverts to the government; the
fact that concessionaires have the exclusive right to develop a certain project exacerbates this problem (i.e., absence
of competition in a given project’s sector and loose “regulatory” authority of host country in its oversight of such
project). See Nassar, supra note 8 at 67.
74) See Article 37 (1) item 4. of Enforcement Decree. For international lenders skeptical of whether the Korean
government would honor such guarantees, according to Shinhan Macquarie Financial Advisory, the government has
actually made payment on the revenue guarantee on the toll road between the Incheon International Airport and
Seoul. See Lord, supra note 5 at 42.
75) See PICKO/KRIHS, PPI PROGRAM AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN KOREA, 17.
76) See id. Lenders will want to try and subordinate the government’s right to the excess project revenues in
relation to the lenders’ senior debt repayment.
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revenue does not necessarily translate into a financial subsidy form the government.
In many cases, the government provides alternative support, such as an increase in
the tariff rate to be charged by the concessionaire or an extension of the concession
period for the project. These alternative measures should be spelled out as clearly as
possible in the concession agreement.77) For example, the concession agreement
should provide the mechanism for calculating the shortfall and for determining how
the shortfall in profits will be compensated (i.e., through financial subsidy, increase
in tariffs or concession period). Furthermore, the parties should clarify whether the
minimum revenue guarantee will apply if the government requests lower tariffs
pursuant to Article 10 of PPI Act. For example, the concessionaire should be entitled
to the full difference between actual profits and estimated profits due to the lower
tariff attributable to a request by the government.  
The preferred approach from the concessionaire’s perspective, however, would
be to amend the PPI Act to provide details on the mechanism for compensation.
The government has recently announced a plan to “rationalize” its minimum
revenue guarantee system by implementing such measures as: 1) a reduction of the
fixed period for minimum revenue guarantee (i.e., 15 years), 2) a de-escalation of the
percentage for minimum revenue guarantee during the life of the fixed period and 3)
reimbursement of only a percentage of the difference between the guaranteed
minimum revenue and the actual revenue.78) As such rationalization measures are
specifically aimed at encouraging efficient operation of PPI projects,79) the measures
may alleviate concerns that PPI projects are not operating in a competitive
environment where companies utilize economic resources in an efficient manner.
Depending upon the financial projections of a given project, however, project
sponsors may or may not necessarily favor the minimum revenue guarantee, as the
projected revenues may be favorable enough that the cost of having to revert the
excess revenues to the government may outweigh the added benefit of revenue
77) Lenders to PPI projects will want to maintain adequate control over this process, which can be addressed in
the financing documents.
78) See 2003 Annual Plan, 100. For example, the de-escalating guarantee would operate so that 80% to 90% of
the estimated revenue would be guaranteed during the first 5 years of the fixed period, 70% to 80% for the next 5
years, and 60% to 70% for the last 5 years.
79) See id.
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protection.80) Accordingly, the parties may decide to forego including any reference
to a minimum revenue guarantee in the concession agreement. In such a case, the
concessionaire may be foregoing a later claim to a government subsidy under Article
37 of PPI Act in case of a deterioration of project economics. The government could
argue, in the event of a dispute under such provision, that the concessionaire had
waived its right to the government subsidy pursuant to Article 37 of PPI Act, since
the concessionaire could have reasonably foreseen a possible deterioration of the
project’s revenue stream at the time of execution of the concession agreement. In
this regard, sponsors in most concession-based projects - especially those with
project revenues generated in local currency but that have foreign-denominated debt
- may want to ensure the later availability of the government subsidy by expressly
reserving this right under the concession agreement.
G. Change in Total Project Costs
A substantial project risk for project sponsors in a concession-based project is the
inability to obtain authorization for an increase in project costs (including
construction costs) as a result of subsequent events beyond the project sponsor’s its
control. This risk is addressed in the PPI Act which provides that the total project
cost under the concession agreement may not be amended except in the case of: 1)
adjustments resulting from price fluctuations during the construction period, or 2)
adjustments resulting from “inevitable causes” pursuant to the concession
agreement.81) This provision is very important in that the economics of a project may
drastically deteriorate if project sponsors are unable to obtain an automatic adjustment
to the government subsidy in the event of an increase in project costs (especially
construction costs). Although the PPI Act does not provide for an automatic
adjustment, the concession agreement should provide project sponsors with an
automatic increase in the government subsidy for any recognized increase in project
80) The recent financing for the Pusan Newport project was arranged without the minimum revenue guarantee.
See Nick Lord, “A new era for Korean project finance”, FinanceAsia.com, June 3, 2003. But this project also
generated dollar revenues to match its dollar financing, a benefit that is not common in most Korean project
financings.
81) See Article 22 (3) of Enforcement Decree.
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costs.82)  The preferred approach from the perspective of private investors would be
for the government to amend the relevant provision of the PPI Act to provide for an
automatic adjustment in the event of an increase in project costs.
H. Unilateral Change in Project Scope
A fundamental principle outlined in the UNCITRAL Guide is that governments
should provide “assurances that private property [will be] respected by the host
country and not interfered with other than for reasons of public interest and only if
compensation is paid.”83) In this regard, a significant project risk for both sponsors
and lenders is the ability of the Korean government to unilaterally alter the scope of
the project.84) For instance, Article 29 (1) of PPI Act - starting out by stating that the
competent authority shall not alter the rights of the concessionaire with respect to the
use of the project facilities pursuant to Article 25 (1) and (2) - provides that the
competent authority may, upon consulting with the concessionaire, alter such rights
“where the State or local government requires it for any direct[ly] official or public
82) Other options available to the government in lieu of the subsidy in such case are an increase in the tariff
rates or an extension of the concession period. In such cases, the lenders to the project will want to maintain control
over any decision-making for the grant of relief other than the government subsidy.
83) See sec. A. par. 4. of UNCITRAL Guide.
84) See Wallace, supra note 50 at 293-294 (stating that this is common in many civil law countries where
administrative law, rather than private, commercial law, is applicable to concession-based projects and related
agreements.) The notion that the government has the right to unilaterally alter projects may also be attributable to the
idea that infrastructure projects are a public service where private sector investment should be upon government
authorization and regulated accordingly. See Nassar, supra note 8 at 60. Indeed, section 2.3 of the 2003 Annual Plan
broadly reaffirms this notion in providing that the “competent authority may supervise the business operation of the
concessionaire and issue orders necessary to prevent inferior construction and operation of the facilities.” It further
goes on to state that the “competent authority may take necessary administrative measures such as change the
concessionaire, suspend or alter the construction, reconstruct or return to their original state any of the facilities, in
the event of violation of laws and regulations by the concessionaire, or when required by the public interest.” The
competent authority also has the right to initiate an adjustment of the tariff level upon negotiation with the
concessionaire, if deemed to “significantly impair the benefit to user(s).” See sec. 3.2 C. of 2003 Annual Plan. Such
overarching administrative powers are quite significant.
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use” and for such use as prescribed by the Enforcement Decree.85) The
concessionaire is entitled to compensation from the administrative agency using the
project facilities for any loss incurred as a result of such use.86)
Despite the language requiring “consultation” with the concessionaire, this
provision nevertheless poses a significant risk to project sponsors and lenders who
may not have any power to stop the government from altering the rights of the
concessionaire with respect to the project facilities, regardless of the specific
provisions in the concession agreement contrary to any such right of alteration.  For
instance, the strict reading of Article 29 (1) does not appear to give the concessionaire
the right to object to any proposed use by the government-only a “consultation” right.
It is also unclear under what circumstances the government could exercise its rights
under this provision. What types of uses would qualify as “direct[ly] official” or
“public”? Another issue is how the government will go about compensating the
concessionaire for its losses incurred as a result of such alteration.  How will the
losses be calculated,87) and in what form will the compensation be made?  These
issues are left unspecified in the statute. Such unilateral right to alter the scope of the
project undermines free bargaining, contravening the general principle outlined in the
UNCITRAL Guide.88) It is clear that this statutory provision should be amended in
order to provide more certainty to project participants.
I. Foreign Financing/Foreign Exchange Risk
The concessionaire is authorized to obtain foreign financing pursuant to the
Foreign Exchange Transactions Act (“FETA”) and the Foreign Investment
Promotion Act.89) Furthermore, concession agreements in Korean PPI projects will
85) Article 26 (1) of Enforcement Decree states that the project facilities may be used by the government where
the “competent authority recognizes that public use of the facility concerned is absolutely necessary for the public
interest, and the objective of the project cannot be achieved by any other way than to change the use of the
facilities.”
86) See Article 29 (2) of PPI Act.
87) Article 26 (2) 1. of Enforcement Decree only states that: 1) losses from failure to recover total project cost
and 2) other losses incurred shall be compensated through negotiation with the concessionaire.  
88) See id. at 293.
89) See Article 54 of PPI Act.
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typically include a provision whereby the government is required to provide its full
assistance with respect to the concessionaire’s execution of financing in general.  
Furthermore, the government will protect project sponsors from foreign exchange
fluctuations in excess of a certain threshold level.90) Typically, pursuant to the
concession agreement, the government will guarantee a percentage of the total
foreign exchange loss calculated for a given year.
Project sponsors and lenders should also be aware that any guarantee of debts
that is: 1) between a Korean “resident”91) and a “non-resident”92) requires the prior
approval of the Ministry of Finance and Economy (“MOFE”)93) and 2) between
“residents,” in which payment may be made with “foreign currency,”94) reporting95)
to the MOFE. Project sponsors and lenders should obtain the advice of local lawyers
on the effect of such provisions, especially as to the level of scrutiny in the approval
process for debt guarantees made by Korean residents for the benefit of non-resident
lenders. As debt guarantees between Korean residents that involve the payment of
foreign currency require reporting to MOFE - presumably a lower level of
government scrutiny-these regulations may affect the structuring of debt guarantees.
Article 3 (1) 13 of FETA provides, however, that “branch offices, local offices or
other offices of non-residents located in the Republic of Korea shall be deemed to be
90) See PICKO/KRIHS, PPI PROGRAM AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN KOREA, 18 for a summary of
the foreign exchange protection.
91) See Article 3 (1) 12. of FETA. “Residents” is defined as any “private person who has a domicile or
residence in the Republic of Korea, and any juristic person whose main office is located in the Republic of Korea.”
See id. 
92) See Article 3 (1) 13. of FETA. “Non-residents” is defined as any private person and any juristic person other
than residents: provided, that branch offices, local offices or other offices of non-residents, located in the Republic of
Korea, shall be deemed to be residents notwithstanding whether such offices have the legal authority as agents.” See
id.
93) See Article 18 (2) of FETA.  
94) See Article 3 (1) 2. of FETA.
95) See Article 18 (1) of FETA. The reporting requirement does not apply to “negligible or standardized capital
transactions designated by the Minister of Finance and Economy...” See id. Local lawyers should advise whether
this reporting requirement must be satisfied prior to or after the debt guarantee is executed. If the reporting
requirement is prior to the execution of debt guarantee, such requirement in practice may operate similar to an
approval by MOFE.  
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residents notwithstanding whether such offices have the legal authority as agents.”
Notwithstanding any withholding tax issues with respect to tax treaties applicable to
lenders’ receipt of interest income, lenders booking the project debt through a
Korean branch office could presumably qualify its branch office as a “resident”
under Article 3 (1) 13 of FETA, requiring only prior approval by MOFE on any
related debt guarantee.
J. Buyout Payment
Under Article 59 of PPI Act, the concessionaire has the right to request a buyout
of the project by the government in the event of: 1) certain force majeure events
which cause a delay of six months or longer or increase in construction or operating
costs of more than fifty percent, 2) failure of the government to perform its
obligations under the concession agreement, causing delay of six months or longer,
or 3) a cause pursuant to the concession agreement whereby the competent authority
determines it reasonable to make the buyout payment.96) Project participants should
note that the language of this provision does not require the government to
automatically make the buyout payment if the concessionaire makes the request.
Furthermore, the provision does not specify the method for calculating the buyout
payment nor the manner in which the buyout payment is to be made, as these are
matters usually specified in the terms of the concession agreement. In any event, the
calculation of the buyout price should be determined in consideration of the market
value of the project (e.g., net present value of future income streams), since this will
ensure fairness to both parties, and should at a minimum include outstanding project
debt (principal and interest).
VI. Market for PPI Financing
Korean PPI projects are typically financed through a combination of equity, debt
and government subsidy. Because the government subsidy - which can be as high as
30% of total project cost in some cases-is often counted as equity without conferring
96) See Article 39 of Enforcement Decree.
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any corresponding ownership rights to the government, both the sponsors’ return on
equity (boosted by the percentage of subsidy) and the project’s credit profile are
enhanced.  
Most lenders to Korean PPI projects typically require (in addition to upfront
equity injections as opposed to pro rata injections) project completion guarantees97)
and cash deficiency support from the project sponsors.98) While favorable for lenders
seeking mitigation of project risks, project completion guarantees require project
sponsors to maintain project debts on their own balance sheets, which detract from
the benefits of using special purpose project companies in project financings (i.e.,
restricting the project debts to the special purpose project company).99) Furthermore,
such practice is not in accordance with “limited recourse” financing prevalent in
international project finance-referring to limited obligations and responsibilities of
the project sponsor 100) in contrast to the “classic non-recourse project financing
[which] would result in no potential liability to the project sponsor for the debts or
liabilities of an individual project”.101) Accordingly, the level of recourse in a
particular financing is determined by the specific risks in a project and the appetite
of the credit markets to accept such risks.102)
Korea’s PPI program has recently witnessed keen interest by both domestic and
foreign lending institutions. Most notably on the domestic front most of the domestic
funding to date has been led by the government-owned Korea Development Bank
97) Project completion guarantees require the project sponsors to be liable in the event the project company’s
financial situation prevents it from carrying on with the project.
98) See Lee and Kim, supra note 44. Another harsh practice of lenders to projects is the request for a blank
promissory note from sponsors with a power of attorney allowing the lenders to later insert an amount, which they
deem appropriate in the case of a certain triggering event. If the sponsors refuse to honor the promissory note, this
causes tremendous difficulty for sponsors in later securing credit facilities from Korean banks. See id.
99) Project finance structures are used to assist in undertaking large debt commitments with a minimum of risk,
which permit “off-balance sheet” treatment of the debt of the project company. See SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW
AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE, 12 (Kluwer Law International).
100) See id. at 8. “For example, if the lenders perceive that substantial risk exists during the construction phase
of a project, they could require that the project sponsor agree to infuse additional equity if the risk actually
materializes. The lender would have recourse to the project sponsor’s assets until the risk subsides or construction is
complete. Thereafter, the loan would be nonrecourse.” See id.
101) See id. 
102) See id.
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(“KDB”). This financial institution is truly a dominant player in the Korean financial
market, and it has been involved in most of the notable PPI projects to date.103) In some
of the more recent transactions, however, other Korean banks have been asserting
themselves in a bid to compete with KDB, and even non-bank financial institutions-
such as life insurance companies-have been actively pursuing arranging roles.104)
Government policy currently seeks to promote the active participation of non-
bank financial institutions such as pension funds.105) In this regard, one notable
development is the Korean Road Infrastructure Fund (“KRIF”), which was
established in January of 2003 by Shinhan Macquarie Financial Advisory (a joint
venture between Shinhan Financial Group and Macquarie Bank of Australia) as a
10-year closed fund with some US$300 million raised from Korean institutional
investors.106) Such developments should have a positive impact on Korea’s PPI market,
as project companies looking to borrow on the domestic front will undoubtedly be
able to secure more competitive rates and terms and conditions than were previously
available.  
Furthermore, increased competition among domestic lenders, combined with the
increasing availability of foreign financing, may facilitate the gradual move toward
limited recourse project finance for Korean PPI projects. International lenders
hungry for solid (and relatively safe) returns on their lending have recently been
eager to participate in Korea’s PPI market. With the downturn in the global
economy, international banks in the Asian region have actively sought arranging
roles for some of the largest and most high profile (by even international standards)
Korean PPI projects. Some of these projects have had significant foreign debt
components relative to domestic debt components,107) which undoubtedly increases
103) For the period from 1995 to June 2003, Korea Development Bank had successfully arranged 7,435 billion
won in debt financing for 23 PPI projects. See Korea Development Bank, Project Finance, available at <http://www.
kdb.co.kr/screen/jsp/IHEng/IHEngUPrt02050001E.jsp>.
104) Indeed, the Mid/Long Term Plan envisages private participation by insurance companies, mutual aid
associations and pension fund management companies.  
105) See 2003 Annual Plan, 99.
106) See CNN.com, Korea fund buys toll road stake.
107) For instance, on the Pusan Newport project, the offshore facility was US$276 million as opposed to the
onshore facility of KRW245 billion. See Lord, supra note 80.
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the bargaining power of the international banks in negotiating the financing terms
and conditions and in the intercreditor relationship with domestic banks.  Further, the
more recent Korean PPI projects have been concluded as true limited recourse
financings, most notably the US$1 billion Pusan Newport project.108)
An increase in foreign investor participation by creditworthy participants will
also contribute towards the development of limited recourse finance, as foreign
project sponsors with strong financial backing will decrease the overall project risk
perceived by potential lenders, which should reduce the level of credit enhancement
mechanisms required by lenders. 
A. Common Terms Agreement 
Not all projects under the Korean PPI program include foreign financing, and a
number of factors may lead to foreign debt participation in a Korean PPI project.
One notable issue is whether one group of lenders will have their rights and
obligations adequately protected in relation to another lending group.  
One approach used in international project financing for different lending groups
to have each of their rights clearly defined is to effect a common terms agreement-
often with a governing law provision of a neutral country-which enumerates the terms
and conditions which are “common” to all lending groups while leaving other more
basic terms unique to each of the different currency facilities to be dealt with in
separate loan agreements for each lending group. International lenders will argue
that the use of a well-defined common terms agreement is in accordance with
international practice. As can be imagined, different lending groups will have
arguments for or against the use of a common terms agreement (which typically
contains the conditions of precedents, representations and warranties, undertakings-
positive and negative, accounts structure and events of default). International lenders
will often cite the need for the relative parity of rights and obligations of all lending
groups to ensure that one lending group does not have any advantage over or is
108) The lead arrangers on the offshore facility were Banca Intessa, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, Credit
Lyonnais, DZ Bank and Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank. The arrangers on the onshore facility were Kookmin
Bank and Samsung Life Insurance. See id.
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adversely affected in relation to the other lending group(s). Despite such fundamental
differences of opinion, domestic and foreign lenders to Korean PPI projects have
implemented common terms agreements, but often only in projects where one of the
key project sponsors is a foreign investor.
VII .  Governing Law and Dispute Resolution
A significant point of contention between the different lending groups on
whether to use a common terms agreement surrounds the issue of the governing law,
as one lending group, depending on the particular governing law chosen, may
believe it is at a relative disadvantage to the other lending group(s).  International
lenders, however, will argue that resort to the laws of a neutral jurisdiction (e.g.,
England or New York) - with a well-tested and in-depth body of financial and
commercial laws - will ensure that the rights of all parties are adequately protected.  
In the Korean PPI context, Korean lenders will often cite the need to have a
separate loan facility agreement governed by Korean law, pointing to such issues as
enforcement of security over assets and accounts of the project company and
sponsors often located in Korea. Some Korean lenders will also argue that it would
be impractical to require the Korean courts (if resorted to in the event of a dispute) to
bring in outside legal experts to testify on foreign law, which would undoubtedly
create unnecessary delays and costs. Such claims, however, may be overrated as, in
practice, the only court proceedings that are often necessary are for obtaining
judgments for payment defaults, which do not involve any complex legal issues.109)
But such arguments overlook one practical legal advantage from the standpoint
of Korean lenders; an enforcement action would have to be brought before a Korean
court before original action could be taken over the project company’s assets located
in Korea, which means the ever present possibility that the Korean courts may
ignore the governing law when it conflicts with overriding Korean law, regardless of
whether the original action is brought in Korea or in another jurisdiction.110) This may
109) See PHILIP WOOD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, 6 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1980).
110) See id. at 4.
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involve the Korean court overriding the choice of foreign law with respect to: 1) a
Korean party’s capacity to enter into contracts and 2) the law pertaining to the
creation and enforcement of security interests.  
This is particularly true if the enforcement action in the Korean courts concerns
an award by a foreign court upon the parties’ resort to litigation as the method of
dispute resolution.111) Korean courts may not necessarily be obliged to recognize and
enforce foreign court judgments, and the Korean courts may exercise broad judicial
review,112) particularly with respect to procedural safeguards, e.g., whether: 1) a final
and conclusive judgment was rendered by the foreign court, 2) the foreign
jurisdiction recognizes judgments rendered by the Korean courts, and 3) the foreign
judgment is consistent with public policy in Korea.
Such fundamental differences of opinion on governing law between the different
lending groups are, of course, not a novel issue restricted to Korean project finance.
It can be encountered in many different commercial contexts. Indeed, the issue of
governing law goes to the heart of the relative bargaining power of the parties
concerned.
A. Arbitration
In contrast, parties seeking to have the Korean courts enforce an arbitral award
by an international arbitration panel should note that Korea is a signatory to the UN
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award (1958)
(commonly referred to as the “New York Convention”), which obligates signatories
to enforce arbitral awards obtained in foreign jurisdictions. Due to the potential
benefits of flexibility, efficiency and neutrality of arbitration over litigation as a
means of dispute resolution, foreign investors in Korean PPI projects would be well-
advised to incorporate a carefully drafted arbitration provision into its project
documents. This will increase the possibility that Korean courts will enforce
decisions reached by arbitration panels without any substantial review of the merits
111) See Dana H. Freyer, “Practical Considerations in Drafting Dispute Resolution Provisions in International
Commercial Contracts-A US Perspective”, J. INT’L ARB., 24 (1998).
112) See id.
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of the case. Private investors should note, however, that the arbitration law of a
particular country is potentially significant to an arbitral award since such law may
prescribe certain procedural safeguards prior to enforcement by the local courts.
Under the Arbitration Act adopted by Korea in 1999, Korean courts must enforce
arbitral awards (whether foreign or domestic) with the same effect as court
judgments.113) Arbitral awards, however, are not enforceable in Korea unless a court
renders an enforcement judgment.114) Perhaps more significantly, the Arbitration Act
distinguishes between domestic and foreign arbitral awards and applies different
conditions to their enforcement. For example, arbitral awards obtained in the
Republic of Korea are to be recognized or enforced, subject to the following grounds
under which a court may set aside the arbitral award: 1) the subject matter of the
dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under Korean law or 2) the
recognition or enforcement of the award would be in conflict with the morals or
other public policy of Korea.115)
In contrast, foreign arbitral awards are distinguished between those rendered in
signatory countries of the New York Convention - which are to be governed under
relevant provisions of the convention - and those rendered in non-signatory
countries, which are to be governed pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act.116) In the
latter case, the Arbitration Act requires the Korean courts to apply procedures related
to enforcement of foreign court judgments as embodied in the Civil Procedure
Act.117) In order to avoid a potentially broader judicial review by the Korean court on
at least procedural matters, foreign investors should take care to draft arbitration
113) See Article 35 of Arbitration Act.
114) See Article 37 (1) of Arbitration Act.
115) See Article 36 (2) par. 2 of Arbitration Act.
116) See Article 39 of Arbitration Act. For foreign arbitral awards governed under the New York Convention,
relevant provisions of such convention provide that a court may refuse to recognize or enforce a foreign arbitral
award if: 1) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the State of
enforcement or 2) recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy in the State of
enforcement. See Article V 2. of New York Convention. Please note that these are the same conditions under which
a Korean court may refuse enforcement of domestic arbitral awards pursuant to Article 39 of Arbitration Act. As in
the case of a petition for setting aside of a domestic arbitral award, the Korean court may exercise a degree of
discretion in determining whether a foreign arbitral award is in contravention of public policy.
117) See Article 39 (2) of Arbitration Act. This provision provides that Articles 203, 476 (1) and 477 of Civil
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provisions into the project documents by choosing an arbitral seat in a country that is
a signatory to the New York Convention.  Otherwise, the Korean courts may
exercise a wider discretion over a foreign arbitral award in rendering an enforcement
judgment. Foreign investors should note, however, that Article 477 of Civil
Procedure Act prohibits the Korean courts from reviewing the merits of a case
decided in a foreign court.
VIII. Issues of “Bankability”
A. Project Documentation
Many of the notable risk factors inherent in Korean PPI projects are related to the
lack of clarity in the project documentation (e.g., concession agreement, construction
contract, operation & maintenance agreement, shareholding agreement, etc.), which
are often not in accordance with international best practice.118) Especially for
international lenders mandated as arrangers of US dollar facilities for the project
company, clarity in the project documentation will be a fundamental concern as to
the “bankability” of the project. Without sufficient evidence that the project is
bankable, international lenders will be inclined to conclude that the project’s risk
profile does not justify the investment. 
Procedure Act apply mutatis mutandis to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards from non-
signatory countries (of the New York Convention). Accordingly, Article 203 of Civil Procedure Act provides that a
final foreign judgment shall be valid and enforceable only if it satisfies the following conditions: 1) the jurisdiction
of the foreign court of judgment is not denied by any law or treaty, 2) if the losing defendant is Korean, he received
service of summons or other orders necessary for the commencement of the action other than by public notice, or he
made an appearance without receiving service thereof, 3) the foreign judgment is not contrary to the public policy or
good morals of Korea, and 4) reciprocity is ensured between Korea and the foreign country. Furthermore, Article
477 of Civil Procedure Act provides that 1) an enforcement judgment shall be rendered without inquiring into the
merits of the foreign judgment and 2) a suit demanding an enforcement judgment shall be dismissed in the following
cases: (i) when it is not certified that the judgment of a foreign court has become irrevocable or (ii) when the foreign
judgment does not fulfill the conditions prescribed in Article 209 of Civil Procedure Act.
118) For example, Korean construction contracts are often brief in comparison to construction contracts
executed by parties to international project finance.
The Korean Market for Private Participation in Infrastructure
248
International lenders will often cite the failure of Korean project documentation to
meet prevailing standards in international project financing. As a result international
lenders will often seek to address its concerns through appropriate undertakings and
covenants in the financing documents, through amendments to the project documents
or by entering into direct agreements with the relevant project participants (e.g., the
concession-granting competent authority, contractors, operators, etc.).  
The relative success or failure of lenders to procure amendment of the project
documentation-many times executed well in advance of entering the financing
phase-based on due diligence efforts is a difficult task at best, but which nevertheless
must be undertaken. It is at this stage where the lenders must sufficiently determine,
through the advice of their technical, legal and other advisors reviewing the various
project documentation, whether the project is indeed “bankable.”   
In particular, Korean PPI project documentation generally lacks the clear
interface expected between the various documents (e.g., concession agreement vis-a-
vis the construction contract, concession agreement vis-a-vis the operation and
maintenance agreement and the construction contract vis-a-vis the operation and
maintenance agreement). Without this clear interface among the project documents,
it is difficult for lenders to assess whether a certain potential liability of the project
company resulting from a particular “triggering event” under one project document
is adequately covered in another project.
A prime example of this problem can be seen in force majeure provisions, which
are sometimes different under the concession agreement and the construction
contract in a particular project. This will expose the project company to the risk that
the construction contractor could be excused for performance under the construction
contract for a particular force majeure event while the project company would
continue to be liable for its timely construction obligations to the governmental
authority under the concession agreement. This could result if the force majeure
event occurring under the construction contract is not likewise deemed a force
majeure event under the concession agreement.119)
119) This problem is also typically present in other project documents such as the operation, maintenance and
management agreement. This problem, however, “can be cured with a so-called “resurrection” clause, in which the
contractor agrees with the project company that where force majeure inconsistencies exist between contracts, the
contractor will not receive relief greater than the relief available to the project company under other relevant
contracts.” See Hoffman, supra note 99 at 254.
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Whether a contractor will take the risk of certain force majeure events will also
be determined to an extent by the prevailing practices in a particular country’s
construction industry. For instance, in the United States, contractors generally
assume the risk of strikes by the contractors’ employees or subcontractors.120)
Although this may not necessarily be the case in the Korean context, given the
highly volatile nature of the Korean labor market, the project company (and the
lenders) should argue that Korean contractors are in the best position to assume the
risks associated with labor disputes.
Another related example is in liquidated damages provisions. Liquidated damages
recoverable from the contractor by the project company under the construction
contract may not be sufficient to cover the project company’s liquidated damages
obligations to the governmental authority pursuant to the concession agreement in
the event of construction delays/losses resulting from a breach by the construction
contractor. Lenders will want these issues adequately addressed through appropriate
credit enhancement measures before considering the project “bankable.”
B. Exercise of “Step-In” Rights
A major area of concern for lenders is their ability to secure various rights over a
project, notably “step-in” rights whereby the lenders are able to exercise the rights
and carry out the duties of the project company in the event of a default under a
particular project document. For example, the lenders may wish to cure a certain
default of the project company prior to the governmental authority’s exercising its
right to terminate the concession agreement for default by the project company. This
can most effectively be addressed by a document known as a “direct agreement,”
which secures the rights of the lenders to exercise certain rights in relation to a
project. A direct agreement between the lenders and the other project participants
(e.g., governmental authority, contractors, operators, etc.) will address the lenders’
rights in relation to the project.121)
120) See Hoffman supra note 99 at 255.
121) Please note, however, that the Korean government does not typically enter into such direct agreements
with private project participants.
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C. Termination Payment
Although termination payment provisions often included in concession
agreements for Korean PPI projects presumably require the government to provide
the concessionaire with a termination payment in the event that the concession
agreement is terminated due to the government’s breach, it is unclear in certain
projects whether the government would be required to make a termination payment in
cases where the concession agreement is terminated for breach by the concessionaire.
Although this issue can be adequately addressed in a direct agreement, the Korean
government, upon request from the concessionaire, has more often addressed this
issue in a document of less-binding form (e.g., statement of clarification).122) Because
the termination payment would be a critical factor for project lenders, however, the
concession agreement should at least provide for all circumstances under which the
government would pay the termination payment - ideally even in the case of
termination of the concession for breach by the concessionaire - and the method for
calculation of such payment.
D. Enforcement of Security Interests
Lenders to project financings that are implemented on a non-recourse or limited
recourse basis will be particularly concerned with the ability to enforce its various
security rights over project assets most often located in the host country. The security
interest of the project lenders will include: 1) ownership rights to the project
company, 2) all rights, title and interest of the project company in the project
agreements (e.g., concession agreement, construction contract, operation and
maintenance) and 3) mortgages and charges over project company assets, including
bank accounts. In this regard, it is crucial from the standpoint of international project
lenders to determine whether Korea maintains a fair and adequate system of laws
and procedures for the enforcement of security interests. This aspect of project
financing becomes more crucial given the fact that the courts of many host countries
122) Other than agreements that they are statutorily authorized to execute (e.g., concession agreement),
government officials in the Korean PPI context are often not willing to enter into any binding agreements such as a
direct agreement with project participants.
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may not recognize the choice of law of another jurisdiction (e.g., English or New
York law) in governing the enforcement of security interests over assets located in
the host countries.123) It is this risk that should be taken into consideration when
working with local lawyers to make sure that the rights of project lenders with
respect to security interests are adequately protected.
Another major concern for lenders is whether the governmental authority may
hinder the lenders’ ability to exercise their rights over the security pledged by the
project company for securing the project financing. This concern has in some cases
been addressed in the Korean PPI context through the concession agreement,
whereby the competent authority is required to “cooperate” with the lenders in such
cases.  
Potential lenders will also want to note that pursuant to the Annual Plan, the
competent authority requires a project performance guarantee from a third party to
be jointly liable with the concessionaire or a performance guarantee deposit from the
concessionaire.124) In the case of a non-cash performance guarantee (i.e., issued by a
financial institution), lenders will want to ensure that the issuer will be subordinated
to the lenders in the event of a call under the performance guarantee.
As to the PPI Act in particular, lenders should note that any mortgage on the
operation and management right of the concessionaire must be registered with the
relevant competent authority for validity and enforceability.125) As discussed above,
the operation and management right is deemed a property right under the Civil
Code,126) and security can be taken over the operation and management right in the
form of a kun mortgage.
123) See Richard Walsh,” Pacific Rim Collateral Security Laws: What Happens When the Project Goes
Wrong?”, 4 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 115, 122 (1999).
124) See sec. 2.3 of 2003 Annual Plan. In practice, the performance guarantee deposit can be either cash or an
insurance policy or guarantee issued by a financial institution.  
125) See Article 28 (1) of PPI Act.
126) See Article 27 (1) of PPI Act.
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IX.  Conclusion
Private investors are bound to see a more favorable environment for foreign
investment development as Korea’s private infrastructure market continues to
develop towards prevailing international best practice. Positive foundations are
currently being laid by a partnership between the public and private sectors, which is
bolstered by the Korean government’s firm overall commitment to a liberalized
economy in step with developed countries.  
Private investors, however, should be aware of some very real risks, especially in
the broadly-structured regulatory framework embodied in the PPI Act. Under the
broad provisions of the PPI Act and its Enforcement Decree, parties are left to
hammer out the detailed terms and conditions through the concession agreement.
Although project participants may view this feature as an advantage from the
standpoint of added flexibility in the early phases of a project’s development, it may
at later stages become a serious flaw for all parties concerned, especially where more
detailed provisions in the relevant laws would provide for greater certainty when
disputes arise under the concession agreement. In such cases, the only recourse
available to private investors would be the rights provided under the concession
agreement. Although it is inconceivable that the Korean government would follow
down the path of some other NICs by breaching its international obligations for
domestic political gain, private investors should never underestimate this risk.
Relatedly clarity in the PPI Act could also insulate the government from political
vulnerability to charges of corruption and a rigged bidding process.  The current PPI
framework provides for great flexibility, but such flexibility may turn into a liability
for the government at later stages if certain political sectors or civic groups allege
wrongdoings, pointing to the lack of detailed provisions in the PPI Act and the wide
discretion exercised by public officials in the negotiating process for the concession
agreement.
Despite such risks, private investors can find comfort in the Korean government’s
strong commitment to the PPI scheme. Because of this fact, Korea’s PPI market
should continue to generate much interest from international lenders and sponsors in
the years to come.
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